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ABSTRACT  
 
This study presents a mathematical model for determining cost-effective emissions' control strategies in 
Europe, by minimizing sulphur abatement costs subject to different pollution control targets. The 
purpose is to compare the efficiency of a uniform percentage emissions reduction with a scenario that 
takes variation in environmental conditions into account. Some alternative criteria for re-allocating 
abatement costs between countries are considered, to see which countries are penalized and which are 
favoured by the proposed approaches, and which approaches should be "preferred" on efficiency 
grounds. Underlying the proposed model is the belief that a full cost-benefit analysis of acid rain 
abatement is infeasible. The model focuses on the costs of abatement and provides an estimation of the 
gains (or losses) that countries could achieve if they co-operate in their policies rather than act 
independently.   
  
 
Keywords: Sulphur emissions; abatement; mathematical programming. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An earlier version of this paper has been presented as: 
 
Optimal sulphur emissions abatement in Europe, University of York, Department of Environmental 
Economics and Environmental Management, Discussion Paper Series 93-02.  
  
 
2 
 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 The industrial age brought scientific and technological progress in our society, but it 
also brought "acid rain".  The vastly increased burning of fossil fuels to generate heat and 
electricity and a growing reliance on motor vehicles are principally to blame. Fossil fuels 
contain chemical elements, including carbon (C), hydrogen (H), oxygen (O), sulphur (S) and 
nitrogen (N). When fuels (such as coal, oil, petroleum and gas) are burned, different chemicals 
are released into the atmosphere as waste products. Oxygen, which is present in air anyway, 
combines with the chemicals to produce oxides - such as sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen 
oxides (NOx) - which are the main pollutants causing acid rain.  NOx (NO,  N2O, NO2) is 
emitted by both stationary sources - power stations for instance - and by vehicles.  SO2 is 
emitted by power stations and industrial and commercial installations, when burning oil and 
coal, and by metal smelters, when burning iron and other metallic ores.    
 Once emitted, some of the oxides fall directly onto surfaces of plants, trees, soils, lakes 
and buildings and this phenomenon is known as dry deposition.  If dry deposition falls onto a 
dry surface, dew or rain will later convert it into acid droplets. If it falls into water then it will 
dissolve. Oxygen in the atmosphere transforms the remaining oxides into sulphuric and nitric 
acids (H2SO4 and HNO3) and these are deposited with rain, snow, hail and dew, which is 
known as wet deposition. Dry deposition generally occurs close to the point of emission. Wet 
deposition often occurs up to thousands of kilometres downwind of emission sources. In other 
words, acid rain can be "exported" by one country and "imported" by another: emissions from 
one country cause depositions also in the territory of its neighbours and beyond. This limits 
the ability of individual countries to reduce environmental damage through their own actions.  
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 The analysis here will be limited to sulphur as the polluting substance to control.  The 
chemical transformation products of SO2 are transported over long distances and 
environmental quality in any one European country is significantly affected by the actions of 
others. It is thus a classic case of externality: the user-country may have little reason to 
concern itself with the sulphur content of the fuels it uses, except to the extent that legislation 
or "moral" incentives force it to take account of sulphur dioxide emissions. Costs imposed on 
receptors (e.g. reduced income or utility, or both, outlay of money) are not borne totally by 
those emitting the pollutants.  In economic terms, the purpose of an acid rain abatement 
strategy is to internalize the externalities cost-effectively and equitably. Given that the 
assimilative capacity of the atmosphere has been used by emitters at no direct cost, emission 
reductions are likely to be accomplished only through public intervention in the form of 
enforcement of edicts. Such edicts are synthesized from acid rain abatement strategies.  
 The recognition of these problems has led to political action in many countries on 
emission standards and other regulations.  The transboundary nature of the problem and the 
need for international coordinated policy measures have been recognized by the 1979 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, which was signed by 32 European 
countries (and the EEC), the USA and Canada. In 1985 a Protocol was added to the 
Convention committing the 21 signatories to reduce sulphur emissions by at least 30% by 
1993 as compared with their 1980 emission levels (the "30% Club"). The cost of air pollution 
control is an important feature of the current international debate on whether and by how 
much to reduce emissions beyond this. Methods for estimating the costs of pollution 
abatement tend to differ from one country to another and from one organization to another. 
Therefore the optimization of air pollution abatement is a useful goal of public policy and is 
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consistent with economic and social objectives.  
 This study describes a mathematical model, the purpose of which is to identify 
cost-effective acid-rain abatement strategies for 27 European countries. The model consists of 
a non-linear programme for minimizing sulphur abatement costs in all European countries 
simultaneously. Estimation of the model enables comparison of the efficiency of a uniform 
percentage reduction in emissions (as in the 30% Club) with a strategy of differentiated 
emission reductions.  
BACKGROUND 
 Before introducing the model in more detail, it is useful to recall that the existing 
literature in the field distinguishes three types of single objective optimization approach:  
(a) Emission driven approaches,  
(b) Deposition constrained approaches and  
(c) A combination of the two, termed deposition based optimal allocation.   
Emission-driven strategies specify emission reductions to be achieved by specific sources. 
When the relationships between source location and receptor location are taken into account 
(case (b)), the problem is then to minimize emission control costs subject to meeting 
predetermined maximum allowable deposition (or  concentration) targets at all receptors.  A 
number of important air and water pollutants such as total suspended particulates and sulphur 
dioxide belong to this category. Most policy action in Europe has previously been in terms of 
emission targets only. Although in principle the two policies are equivalent the main reason in 
justifying the setting of targeted depositions is that in emission-driven strategies certain 
fundamental aspects of acid rain are ignored, namely that pollutants, having been transported 
over potentially long distances and varying meteorological conditions, can result in acidic 
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deposition which varies greatly by location and over time. Additionally, if the relationships 
between source location and receptor location are not taken into account then the fundamental 
aspect of externality (represented by transfer coefficients, explained later) is not taken under 
consideration.  
 The alternative approach of targeted levels of deposition is difficult because of 
uncertainty in defining the appropriate environmental targets. An optimal co-operative policy 
could be approximated by a policy that reduces emissions to levels consistent with critical 
loads. A critical load is the maximum amount of sulphur that the environment can assimilate 
without suffering severe damage (see Nilsson and Grennfelt, 1988, for exact definition; see 
also Hettelingh et al, 1991, for critical load values). In order to take critical loads into account, 
one can construct a model that makes the annual change in the accumulated sulphur in the 
environment equal to the annual deposition minus the assimilative capacity of the environment. 
The assimilative capacity of the environment is accordingly the same as the critical load. The 
"sensitivity" scenario proposed here does this.   
 Acid rain has been subject of considerable scientific and technological research in 
Europe and North America. In Europe studies of the environmental benefits of alternative 
abatement strategies and cost-optimization procedures were undertaken by the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria (which has produced 
the RAINS model, see Alcamo et al., 1990); by the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) at 
York, United Kingdom (which has produced the CASM model); by Cambridge Decision 
Analysts in Cambridge, United Kingdom (who have produced the ACIDRAIN model, see 
CDA/ERL, 1989; CDA, 1989) and Imperial College at London, United Kingdom (with the 
ASAM model). All these European integrated models deal with grids (squares); i.e. the 
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estimated sulphur dioxide emissions are translated into depositions in each square. Europe is 
divided into squares with grid lines of 150 km and with approximately 720 grid lines 
intersections.  
 In North America, much modelling work associated with the development and 
evaluation of efficient acid rain abatement strategies has been undertaken in recent years.  
Shaw and Young (1986) have studied and tested several schemes to reduce sulphate 
deposition in North America while minimizing sulphur removal (1). Sulphur emissions are 
reduced first in the highest ranking source regions, i.e. those that have the largest elements in 
the source receptor matrices i.e. the strongest atmospheric link to sensitive receptor regions. 
Shaw (1986) carried the ranking scheme one step further to include cost factors such that the 
cost of sulphur removal, rather than the amount of sulphur removed from emissions, is 
minimized. The final output of the model was found to be that the emission reductions 
selected by this method cost less than those indicated by an optimization procedure which 
minimizes only the amount of sulphur removed. The "ranking" method is, however, rather 
crude. The optimization methods described in Shaw and Young (1986) and Shaw (1986) do 
not guarantee a global optimum, unlike the standard linear programming techniques. This is 
because the methods in the above two papers look at one receptor point at a time by ranking 
the importance of source regions in contributing deposition to that particular receptor.  
 Other approaches have emphasized minimizing the cost of deposition reductions 
(McBean, Ellis & Farquhar, 1985; Morrison and Rubin, 1985; Streets, Hanson and Carter, 
1984) and have shown that deposition targeted strategies can achieve environmental objectives 
at less cost than emission reduction strategies from each source separately. However, the 
question must be raised of how applicable to Europe such cost optimization schemes could be, 
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in view of various considerations such as the greater relative spatial homogeneity of emission 
sources in Europe compared with the "clustering" of strong source regions in North America 
and the reliance of some optimization methods on the recognition of single receptor points to 
establish a global optimum (as in Shaw and Young, 1986). 
 Shaw (1987), claims that the wide scatter of sources and receptors in Europe and high 
percentage deposition reductions required are such that the difference in efficiency between 
targeted deposition-oriented strategies and more simple emission-based strategies is not nearly 
as marked as for the North American studies. In North America, one could accomplish multi-
receptor optimization by using just one or two receptor points. But in Europe, despite the 
relatively widespread emission pattern, the geographical distribution of optimized emission 
reductions is not widespread, and depends a lot on the choice of target receptor and target 
deposition rate (Chadwick and Cooke, 1988). If depositions were to be reduced in Austria, 
Germany and Switzerland, emission reduction would be confined to the central part of the 
continent and would not extent to Scandinavia, the Balkan countries, Spain, Portugal and the 
former USSR. If, on the other hand, Fennoscandinavia was to be chosen as a target receptor 
area, the optimised emission reductions would be confined to Fennoscandinavia and those 
areas of Europe bordering on the Baltic. If, for either of the above target receptor areas, a 
target deposition was chosen that could not be attained even with the maximum feasible 
emission reduction in this region, then the area where emission reductions are to take place 
would still not extend over Europe but only over those regions whose emissions affect the 
target receptor. If it is not feasible to meet the deposition targets, then the formal optimization 
problem has no solution. This problem can be relaxed only by dropping the insistence that all 
deposition targets are met and by defining a measure of progress towards the targets. One can 
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place a ceiling on total abatement expenditure and find the abatement strategy which 
optimized towards the target.  
 This paper compares two well- tried scenarios. The first scenario is based on the use of 
critical loads and so is in line with the second (deposition constraint) approach outlined above. 
 It considers sensitivity classes in each country by using the map of the relative sensitivity 
ecosystems applied to the indirect effects of acidic depositions after Chadwick and 
Kuylenstierna (1990). It is therefore an ecologically appealing scenario.  The second scenario 
is somewhat more "realistic", in so far as countries are already committed to it, and is based on 
the "30% Club". In this scenario the cost of achieving this standard sets the available European 
budget constraint; and emissions abatement is then maximized subject to the budget constraint 
and an aggregate level of emission abatement no less than 30% of 1980 levels. An alternative 
formulation of this, involves the maximization of the sum of reductions in all countries under 
two constraints. The first constraint sets upper bounds on deposition levels in every European 
country. The second constraint represents a European fund for acid rain abatement. In order 
to fix the maximum available fund for a European abatement control effort and the deposition 
targets in this case, an emission driven strategy is used first. Mäler (1990) uses an approach 
similar to the second scenario here with the difference that Mäler does not consider the 
available fund constraint.  Although he did not implement the idea, Mäler suggests that critical 
loads might provide more suitable targets in this sort of analysis. 
 The paper finds that differentiated deposition targets defined according to critical loads 
are costly, but more efficient in some aspects than a uniform percentage reduction from each 
country. Given that costs are a crucial characteristic, and given that grid-based analysis is 
more appropriate for big integrated models like the CASM and the RAINS models , it would 
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be interesting to see what results are obtained by fitting the cost-data to an individual country 
based study like the one proposed here. At the national level it is generally easier to reach a 
target level of deposition than if the areas are highly dispersed (squares, grids, as in the 
integrated models), since the country is also the unit of political action (e.g. for 
intergovernmental transfers). Also, it is reasonable that highly dispersed targets (squares, 
grids) would make it more costly (e.g. from the point of view of information) to implement 
these targets. However, the cost allocation resulting from the model is not always the most 
‘equitable’ one, in the sense that some countries find themselves sustaining too high ( or too 
low) a cost burden with respect to their real responsibility, or contribution, to total emissions 
and depositions. Therefore, the paper considers the possibility of establishing a new 
distribution of abatement costs across countries on the basis of ‘alternative’ cost allocation 
principles, which would take into account various elements suitable for evaluating each 
country’s responsibility in Europe’s total pollution level.  
 The constraints to the optimization problem vary according to which scenario is 
adopted. Section 1 presents the principles of cost calculation as well as the proposed 
mathematical model and its pollution control targets. In section 2, some alternative criteria for 
re-allocating the optimal level of total abatement costs in Europe (given by the non- linear 
programming model) between the countries are discussed. Section 3 reports the empirical 
results obtained from both the optimization problem and the alternative cost allocation 
principles. Finally, section 4 presents some concluding remarks.  
1. THE MODEL  
 Sub-section 1.1 presents the principles followed in the abatement cost calculation used 
here. In sub-section 1.2 a mathematical programming model for minimizing sulphur abatement 
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costs in all European countries subject to basic deposition constraints is presented. Finally, the 
"scenarios" adopted for fixing the bounds to the depositions' variable are presented in 
sub-section 1.3.    
1.1 Principles of cost calculation   
 For controlling sulphur-emissions the following abatement technologies, involving 
different levels of costs and applicability (depending on the physical and chemical 
characteristics of the fuel used), exist in most industrialized countries:  
(a) gas oil desulphurization,  
(b) heavy fuel oil desulphurization,  
(c) hard coal washing,  
(d) in furnace direct limestone injection,  
(e) flue gas desulphurization and  
(f) fluidized bed combustion.  
The actual control costs of each abatement technology are defined by national circumstances 
and the abatement cost curves depend on the energy scenario adopted. Abatement costs differ 
considerably among countries even for the same technology, mainly due to country-specific 
factors such as sulphur content of fuels used, capacity utilization, size of installations and 
labour, electricity and construction cost factors. These cost input data were obtained country 
by country, sector by sector and fuel by fuel, where 27 countries (i.e. all Europe), 5 sectors 
and 10 fuels were considered, for the year 2000(2).  
 The important initial assumptions for the derivation of these national abatement cost 
curves are the following. First, control costs are independent of order of introduction. Second, 
each abatement technology has a fixed coefficient of abatement when operating at its defined 
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capacity. For example, an FGD unit has an abatement efficiency of 90% (i.e. removes 90% of 
the sulphur content of the fuel in use) at the efficient plant size, while a sorbent limestone 
injection unit has an abatement efficiency of 50% at the efficient plant size. Third, it is 
assumed that the objective of private users is to minimize the costs of abating a given level of 
emissions. Further, fuel use and costs are assumed given independently of abatement policy. 
For the purposes of this exercise, then, abatement by means of reducing the output of 
electricity or other industrial output is ruled out.  Finally, another basic assumption of the cost 
module is that there is a competitive market for sulphur abatement technologies accessible to 
all European countries.  
 Let us now turn to the construction of the abatement cost curves. In each sector and 
for each plant size and fuel there are a number of competing potentially efficient technologies. 
For instance, combinations of reductions of sulphur emissions from coal combustion would 
probably include the use of natural low-sulphur and/or washed coals, as well as the application 
of technologies like sorbent limestone injection, fluidized bed combustion and FGD. Given the 
generic engineering capital and operating control cost functions for each efficient abatement 
technology, total and marginal costs of different levels of emission reduction at each individual 
source (power plant, industrial boiler, petroleum refinery) and in the national (country) level 
can be constructed. The total abatement cost (TAC) of an abatement option, including capital 
and operating cost components, is given by: 
        TAC = (TCC) * CRF(r) + (AOC)  (1) 
where TCC is the total capital cost ($), AOC is the full capacity annual operating and 
maintenance cost ($) and CRF(r) is the capital recovery factor at the real discount rate, r, 
given by               CRF(r) = r / (1-(1+r)-n)  (2) 
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CRF(r) converts a capital cost to an equivalent stream of equal annual future payments, 
considering the time value of money (represented by the discount rate, r).  n represents the 
economic life of asset (in years).  For simplicity we have used a real discount rate of 5% per 
annum for all countries. Resulting annualized costs are expressed in United States $ at their 
1985 levels.  
 The economic efficiency of alternative abatement options (expressed as $ per tonne 
pollutant removed) depends on site specific conditions, and a least cost emission control 
function for each source can be estimated by ranking alternative options in order of increasing 
marginal cost of control. To do so, technologies are sorted so that marginal abatement costs 
increase with the level of abatement sought.  Marginal costs increases are due to the effect of 
switching between technologies as the scale or level of abatement rises. The marginal cost 
curve has a staircase shape (i.e. it is a discontinuous step function) with each step representing 
the incremental effect of a particular discrete abatement technology. The level of each step 
indicates the incremental cost of a technology, and the range of each step the maximum 
incremental amount of sulphur removed by introducing that technology. The sequence of 
efficient technologies gives us the long run marginal cost of abatement. If an abatement 
technology is introduced which has a lower marginal cost at some level of abatement than the 
technology applied before, then this technology should have been applied first.  The control 
methods applied before are not taken into consideration. The most cost – effective techniques 
are the proper abatement techniques for the national decision maker. 
 It is assumed that the regulatory authority seeks to maximize abatement subject to a 
budget constraint: a cheaper option will always be preferred over a more costly one. It would 
be economically inefficient to introduce relatively costly control options unless opportunities 
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for using cheaper alternatives had already been exhausted. The relative economic efficiency of 
alternative options is compared by reference to "cost-effectiveness" which, for a given option 
at a given site, is the total annualized cost divided by the annual tonnes of pollutant removed.  
This type of cost function is potentially useful to policy-makers because it indicates the 
maximum level of emission abatement that can be achieved with a given budget constraint. 
That is, we look for an efficient frontier or a minimal cost envelope, which will give us the 
optimal total cost function; i.e. the corresponding point on the marginal cost curve specifies 
the set of country control options which minimize total abatement costs (Rubin et al., 1986; 
Baumol & Oates, 1979; Kneese & Schultze, 1975; Mäler, 1990).  
  It is important to point out that building up cost curves for individual sources, 
by simply seeking the maximum abatement for any arbitrary budget constraint, may not yield 
satisfactory outcomes. This is because a slight relaxation of the source budget constraint may 
allow adoption of a more efficient technology. The result could be the occurrence of non-
convexities in the cost function, with falling marginal costs over certain relatively small 
  
 
14 
 14 
abatement ranges. At the national level, however, of such ranges would be eliminated as the 
regulatory authority will, we assume, always be able to choose the most cost-effective 
technology at the source level while still satisfying the national aggregate budget constraint. 
For the same reason, since the average cost of abatement falls with the degree of utilization of 
that technology the regulatory authority will only select fully utilized technologies.  Our 
procedure, therefore, is to build up the source cost functions by eliminating any technology 
choices which yield non-convex regions of the cost curve. National cost curves therefore will 
exhibit non-decreasing marginal costs. 
  Using this procedure for every European country and for every plant in every sector 
an abatement cost curve may be derived which shows the least cost emission control function 
for each source. This means that for a country with 100 power plants, industrial boilers and 
petroleum refineries there would be 100 abatement cost curves. To produce a least cost curve 
for a country these curves are aggregated. This is done by finding the technology on the plant 
with the lowest marginal cost per tonne of sulphur removed in the country and the amount of 
sulphur removed by that technology on that plant. This is the first step on the country curve. 
Iteratively the next highest marginal cost is found and is added on the country curve with the 
amount of sulphur removed on the X-axis.  In the final national cost curve each step 
represents an abatement measure that achieves an emission reduction of an extra unit at the 
least cost. The national cost curve consists of a large number of very small steps.  
1.2 A Non-Linear Programming Approach   
 In the non-linear programming approach, an attempt is made to determine an optimal 
"aggregate" level of the abatement coefficient (i.e. of the total emissions' reduction) for each 
of the 27 existing European countries and for Europe as a whole. A complete analysis would 
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be to optimize both emissions and abatement across all European countries. This could in 
principle be done within the following framework: 
   maximize Σi [BEi(SEi)-Ci(SAi)-Qi(Σjdji(SEj-SAj)]  (3) 
                              SEi, SAi 
 
where SEi is the quantity of S emitted in country i, called unconstrained emissions and which 
are assumed to be exogenous in the mathematical problem; BEi(SEi) is net benefits from 
activities generating emissions associated with electricity production and/or other industrial 
activities;  SAi is the quantity of sulphur (in tonnes per year) to be abated in country i, i.e. the 
decision variable; Qi represents damage done by depositions in country i; Ci is the cost of 
abatement in country i; and dji is the proportion of country j's emissions deposited ("exported") 
at receptor-country i, called transfer coefficient  (0  dji 1)
(3).  The first order conditions of 
(3) are: BEk(SEk) - ΣiQi (Σjdji(SEj-SAj) dki  0      SEk  0  (4) 
  -Ck(SAk) + ΣiQi (Σjdji(SEj-SAj) dki  0      SAk  0  (5) 
However, there is unsatisfactory and limited information regarding Qi(.) and BEi(SEi) for all 
European countries; therefore a full cost-benefit analysis is not feasible. At this stage 
optimization exercises will analyze the minimum cost of achieving any given level of 
depositions. With Q unknown a variety of cost-effectiveness exercises can be carried out. A 
more complete model for each European economy is also required in order to analyze the 
trade off between reducing, say, electricity output and introducing abatement methods. 
Therefore, SEi is assumed to be fixed, i.e. the analysis will be conditional on SEi.   
 Underlying the proposed model is the belief that a full cost-benefit analysis of acid rain 
abatement is not feasible. The model focuses on the costs of abatement and provides an 
estimation of the benefits (or losses) that countries could achieve if they co-operate their 
policies rather than act independently. That is, the model seeks to identify a global 
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optimization programme for the whole of Europe considering both the cases of co-operative 
and non co-operative solutions. Clearly the focus on nations is to some extent artificial. Within 
a nation the ecological sensitivity to acid rain varies considerably, so the specification of 
pollution standards Dj is likely to be somewhat arbitrary. Furthermore, the receipt of sulphur 
depositions is unlikely to be evenly spread across a country. However, it is at the national level 
that abatement policies must be implemented.  Although the modelling of pollution flows here 
is to some extent crude, the crucial feature of this model is that it acknowledges the political 
environment in which abatement measures must be implemented. In requiring specifications 
for the country depositions' variable, this study will encourage decision-makers to address a 
key environmental issue: namely, what deposition or emission standards should be applied, and 
how those standards should be secured. For those purpose, a more accurate modelling of 
flows of acid rain would be superfluous (as well as being infeasible). 
 For this purpose, the knowledge of the following data set is required for each country: 
(a) the total amount of sulphur emitted from each plant of each sector mentioned above, (b) 
the associated abatement costs per unit of sulphur removed, (c) the total amount of 
S-depositions, (d) the proportion of  these depositions due to the country's own emissions, (e) 
the proportion due to the country's natural (geologic and biologic) sources and (f) the 
proportion due to the other countries' emissions. Knowledge of the above allows a 
mathematical programming problem, for determining the cost-effective abatement strategies in 
Europe, to be written in its simplest form as follows:              
               Minimize   
27
1
( )i i
i
C SA

       (6) 
         Subject to    
27
1
( )ij i i
i
d SE SA

   j jD B   j=1,2,...,27                     
                  SAi  0     SEi  0                  i=1,2,...,27                        
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where the 27 European countries are considered simultaneously, and where D j is the 
maximum allowance of depositions in country j, called targeted or constrained depositions 
(whose evaluation forms the subject of sub-section 1.2) and Bj is the outstanding level of 
depositions caused by natural sources in receptor-country j, called background pollution (4) . 
The fact that pollution may remain in the atmosphere for long periods of time is addressed in 
the background deposition coefficient.  SAi, SEi, D j and Bj are expressed in tonnes (t). The 
function Ci(SAi), which is the objective function in (6), is the non-linear cost function (convex 
upward-sloping curve implying marginal costs increasing with removal level), giving the cost 
in country i of achieving any level of emissions' reduction SAi by means of the  abatement 
technologies mentioned above. Each of the 27 constraints (one for each European country) 
indicates the minimum annual abatement of sulphur depositions Dj to be secured in country j. 
These reductions are to be achieved by abating the sulphur emitted in each of the 27 European 
countries under consideration. Table 1 presents the value of the unconstrained sulphur 
emissions and the corresponding deposition levels in the year 2000 (5) .  
 The model solves for the optimal values of: (a) the decision variable (SAi
*), i.e. the 
emissions reduction achieved when countries act either independently or in co-operation, (b) 
the depositions reduction achieved independently or in co-operation, (c) the corresponding 
total abatement costs (Ci(SAi)) and (d) the gains (or losses) that can be achieved by each 
country in terms of co-operation with the others rather than acting independently. These 
results are given country by country and for Europe as a whole.   
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Table 1: Unconstrained emissions in the year 2000 (EM), actual depositions (Dep), and targeted 
deposition reductions under scenarios 1 - 2 (Tar dep1 and Tar dep2). All in thousand tonnes of sulphur.  
Countries EM DEP Tar dep1 Tar dep2 
Albania 200.00 154.00 84.40 89.74 
Austria 187.00 376.00 226.70 115.70 
Belgium 329.00 180.00 77.75 27.08 
Bulgaria 961.00 702.00 217.53 283.80 
Czechoslovakia 1216.00 1450.00 1128.80 281.06 
Denmark 143.00 109.00 5.10 11.23 
Finland 270.00 423.00 282.30 112.96 
France 765.00 1183.00 194.95 288.53 
GDR 2099.00 952.00 572.10 191.86 
FRG 1556.00 1235.00 463.35 254.01 
Greece 450.00 594.00 300.66 299.91 
Hungary 467.00 436.00 22.94 123.89 
Ireland 83.00 71.00 7.82 21.83 
Italy 1715.00 1342.00 463.40 477.83 
Luxembourg 15.00 7.00 1.00 0.62 
Netherlands 242.00 199.00 48.00 37.60 
Norway 69.00 247.00 82.00 49.34 
Poland  2182.00 1859.00 685.70 507.23 
Portugal 218.00 232.00 94.50 140.04 
Romania 1374.00 1331.00 315.40 563.46 
Spain 2573.00 2012.00 738.50 1179.93 
Sweden 248.00 534.00 319.30 123.41 
Switzerland 50.00 134.00 58.30 38.42 
Turkey 2203.00 1976.00 305.60 1089.60 
USSR 10890.00 13921.00 3531.80 4260.07 
UK 1844.00 1117.00 458.96 134.36 
Yugoslavia 1891.00 1466.00 635.07 775.32 
Total 34240.00 34242.00 11321.93 11478.84 
 
  
 
19 
 19 
1.3 Pollution control targets  
 Most of the data required by the model are readily available. The country-specific 
abatement cost functions have been described in section 1 and are presented in Halkos (1992). 
EMEP (1989) gives estimates of the flows of sulphur depositions between countries and these 
are used to compute the transfer coefficients dji. The major difficulty in making the model 
operational is to construct plausible pollution standards for each country. In this section we 
examine two alternative strategies: a "sensitivity" scenario based on a country's current 
damage from sulphur depositions; and a scenario concerning the "30% Club".  In the 
constraint of problem (6), j indicates the maximum level of depositions allowed in 
receptor-country j, on the basis of some environmental criteria, or, as they are called in the 
introduction, "scenarios".  In this sub-section, the scenarios expose the methods for evaluating 
D j. The values obtained are shown in table 1.   
 This model is not seeking to model benefits of abatement with any precision. However, 
it is sensible to consider benefits in developing abatement standards, so as to ensure that the 
costs of abatement are imposed in the most cost-effective way. In effect, the analysis seeks to 
secure a cost-effective pattern of pollution abatement, so it is important to direct sulphur 
reduction strategies so as to secure pollution improvements in the areas that would benefit 
most. As a result a deposition constrained abatement scenario is proposed.  
1) A "sensitivity" scenario: This scenario is an "index number" approach. From a relative 
sensitivity map of ecosystems applied to the indirect effects of acidic depositions in Europe 
constructed by Chadwick and Kuylenstierna (1990) it is possible for each country to calculate 
the area of land in each of five "sensitivity" categories.  To each class corresponds a maximum 
deposition allowance, or ecosystem sensitivity threshold, which represents the maximum 
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acceptable level of sulphur deposition on these points, denoted by βk (k=1,2,3,4,5), and is 
expressed in tonnes of sulphur per square kilometre  (t/km2) per year. These are:              
    class 1           β1  5.12  t/km
2 per year 
    class 2           β2 = 2.56  t/km
2 per year 
    class 3           β3 = 1.28  t/km
2 per year  (7)       
    class 4           β4 = 0.64  t/km
2 per year 
    class 5           β5 = 0.32  t/km
2 per year 
These critical loads  are based on ecological criteria for which data for the entire continent are 
available, like geology, soil type, vegetation and amount of rainfall (for more details regarding 
the way that these factors are weighted to give these classes of relative sensitivity to acidic 
depositions, see Chadwick and Kuylenstierna, 1990). The authors of this categorization 
estimate that the most sensitive type of terrain (class 5) is able to tolerate at most 0.32 tonnes 
of sulphur depositions per square kilometre per annum without suffering ecological damage. 
At the other extreme, class 1 terrain is assumed to be capable of tolerating 5.12 tonnes per 
square kilometre per annum. Therefore, the classes are ranked in order of increasing 
sensitivity: class 1 refers to the least sensitive regions and class 5 to the most sensitive regions 
of each country. Let us call these regions "sensitivity areas". Accordingly, we construct the 
following sensitivity index:  
5
1
( )i i ik ik ik
i
D D D a 

     (8) 
Where aik is the area in nation i lying in sensitivity category k, and iks is an index, such that  
 
     min( / , )ik i i ks D A     (9) 
 
Where iA  is the total area (in 1000km
2 ) of country i and k  the critical load for each 
sensitivity class k(k=1,2,3,4,5) given by expression (7). The abatement requirement of 
achieving iD therefore reflects current annual depositions in excess of te environmental 
sensitivity limits proposed by Chadwick and Kuylestierna. It is an index of severity of current 
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pollution in the country in excess of some uniform benchmark. 
  Of course the abatement of sulphur pollution cannot be directed to specific 
geographical areas Thus, although the scheme described above gives a realistic measure of 
levels of depositions harmful to the environment, it does not necessarily reflect a realistic level 
of abatement required to eliminate ecological damage. It implicitly assumes that abatement can 
be directed in the precise quantities to those areas suffering environmental harm from sulphur 
depositions. In practice, of course, acid rain is indiscriminate in the areas it pollutes. 
Therefore, an important assumption in expression (8) is that air pollutants fall uniformly on the 
country's territory, i.e. that climatic factors which could determine a higher concentration of 
depositions in some regions rather than others such as rain, prevailing winds, variability in the 
level of precipitations and other atmospheric phenomena do not have any effect here. This 
assumption is made for simplicity, because of the obvious difficulty of measuring such effects 
and because the analysis needs to be made practicable. 
 A drawback of the targeted deposition reduction approach is that for some 
participating countries the costs of control policies will be much higher than the benefits and 
therefore, such countries might be unwilling to contribute to better environmental conditions 
in other countries if this implies high costs to them. In reality, there are countries where the 
economic circumstances are such that one cannot expect substantial investments in pollution 
control over the next years. Furthermore, one has to consider technological constraints. A 
country might argue that the structure of its electricity producing sector does not allow a rapid 
implementation of new abatement technologies. These economic, technical and political 
observations indicate a difficult environment in which to negotiate a common European policy 
for reducing adverse effects of acid rain. A way out of this situation could be an agreement 
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that allows for cost sharing via a European fund for the abatement of air pollution. Such a 
policy would imply abandoning the Polluter Pays Principle currently generally accepted 
throughout the continent.  
 In practice, the targeted deposition reduction approach produces prohibitively 
expensive abatement costs (see section 3), since it tries to provide a severe constraint to (6), 
on the basis of a "disaggregate" sensitivity analysis, which tries to take into account all 
possible reasons and elements for imposing a given depositions' reduction on each country. 
Scenario 2 relies on the "30% Club" and is therefore a more realistic one, for countries that 
have already reached an agreement and it tries to optimize emissions reduction subject to a 
budget constraint. This formulation of the optimization problem can also be seen as a way to 
reflect budget constraints in addition to emission or deposition targets.  
2) A "budget-constraint" scenario: Ecologists and environmental policy makers now accept 
that there is a relationship between sulphur emissions and depositions. The recognition of this 
relationship has led to efforts to reduce emission levels and the consequent depositions. As 
long-range transport of sulphur compounds in the atmosphere is a well-established 
phenomenon, efforts to reduce emissions have sought international agreement on abatement as 
well as purely national actions like the 30% Club. But as mentioned already, emission-driven 
strategies ignore the transboundary nature of acid rain.  Before this scenario is presented, it is 
better to give an idea of the tasks to be achieved. Table 2 explains how this scenario operates. 
The first two columns present the unconstrained emissions in 1980 and 2000 respectively, 
while the third column presents the level of emissions in 1980 after a 30% reduction (6) . The 
last two columns show the sulphur removed in 2000 (in thousand tonnes and percentages 
respectively) in order to achieve a 30% reduction in the year 2000 but in 1980 emission levels. 
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Table 2:  The "30 percent Club" Protocol  
 
 
 Countries 
Emissions 
(in 000 t) 
 
1980   2000 
Emissions in 
1980 
according to a 
30% reduction 
Sulphur removed in the year 
2000 to achieve 30% reduction 
in 1980 emission levels 
Levels    (%) 
Albania 97    200  68.0 132.1     66.0 
Austria 177    187 124.0 63.1     33.7 
Belgium 392    329 274.4 54.6     16.6 
Bulgaria 874    961 611.8 349.2    36.4 
Czechoslovakia 1679   1216 1175.3  40.9      3.4 
Denmark 200    143 140.0  3.0       2.1 
Finland 275    270 192.5 77.5     28.7 
France 1520   765  1064.0 - 
FRG 1755   1556 1228.5 327.5     21.1 
GDR 2367   2099 1656.9 442.1     21.1 
Greece 248    450 173.6 276.4     61.4 
Hungary 666    467 466.2  0.8      0.2 
Ireland  73    83  51.1 31.9     38.4 
Italy 1637   1715 1145.9 569.1     33.2  
Luxembourg 20    15  14.0  1.0       7.0 
Netherlands 255    242 178.5 63.5      26.3 
Norway 71     69  49.7 19.3      28.0 
Poland 2130   2182 1491.0 691.0     31.7 
Portugal 124    218  86.8 131.2     60.2 
Romania 1040  1374 728.0 646.0     47.0 
Spain 1446  2573 1012.2 1560.8    60.7 
Sweden 266   248 186.2  61.8     24.9 
Switzerland 55   50  38.5  11.5     23.0 
Turkey 513  2203 359.1 1843.9    83.7 
UK 2365  1844 1655.5 188.5    10.2 
USSR 11036 10890 7725.2 3164.8    29.1 
Yugoslavia 816   1891 571.2 1319.8    69.8 
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 In this second scenario, it is important to bear in mind a drawback of the targeted 
deposition reduction approach is that, as mentioned above, for some countries the abatement 
control cost may be higher than the benefits. Additionally, there may exist technological 
constraints of achieving these targets. Therefore, there is a need for international transfers in 
order to motivate all countries to reduce their emissions. A way out of this problem is by 
considering a European fund for the abatement of acid rain pollution.  The following 
optimization problem deals with this issue:                     
                                       
                 Maximize     
1
I
i
i
SA

         (10)           
Subject to     
27
1
( )ji j j
j
d SE SA

  iD    (i=1,...,I)          
                                        
1
( )
I
i i
i
C SA

  
____
AF  
                                                  SAi  0,   SAi  PSAi   and   SAi  SEi 
 
where 
____
AF  is the available fund and PSA the planned reductions already agreed upon (e.g. as 
of the 30% emission reduction in our case). The amount of the fund in this formulation, and 
for our third scenario, is determined as follows.  We first solve the following emission-driven 
optimization problem of each single European country taking the decision at a national level, 
i.e.:          Minimize     Ci (SAi)  
                                            Subject to   (SEi - SAi)  
____
iSE                 (11)    
                                        SAi  0 
where 
____
iSE  is the sulphur emission standard representing, for instance, the 30% reduction 
agreed to by many countries in 1985. The solution to problem (11) gives us the individual 
costs of achieving these emission targets and therefore, the corresponding deposition levels 
after achieving these emission reductions. The sum of these individual costs will give us the 
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maximum European available budget for emissions abatement of 30% of 1980 emission levels 
in the year 2000. This is then used as the available fund (AF) variable in problem (10), while 
the targeted depositions of the first constraint have to be less or equal to the depositions 
achieved in problem (11).  
 As mentioned, the values of D j obtained under scenarios 1 and 2 are shown in table 1. 
The next section introduces some alternative criteria for re-allocating between the countries 
the optimal total abatement costs given by the non – linear programming model. 
 
2. ALTERNATIVE COST ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES   
 It can be seen that our mathematical programming model determines the optimal total 
abatement costs for each country and for Europe as a whole under the two scenarios examined 
in sub-section 1.3. However, some countries could find themselves reaching the required 
target with a greater (lesser) effort than their planned policies in this respect: then the rational 
behaviour solution to the cost distribution problem in (6), i.e. the set of costs (Ci(SAi
*), 
i=1,2,...27), may not correspond to the cost distribution that the countries are effectively 
willing to pay, given their contribution to total emissions and depositions. In other words, the 
effective abatement strategies may not be the equitable ones.  In this section, the optimal total 
abatement cost in all Europe given by the solution of (6) is taken for granted, i.e.  C* = Σi 
Ci(SAi
*), and six alternative criteria, or "principles", for re-allocating C* equitably between the 
countries by taxes or subsidies are examined(7).  An attempt is made to establish cost-sharing 
arrangements between countries and to create a form of European fund for air pollution 
control, which could raise subsidies from member countries in proportion to some indicator 
(such as the gross national product, national emissions, etc) and then distribute these subsidies 
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to countries in such a way as to promote cost-effective emissions' or depositions' reduction 
measures. The corresponding results are shown in tables 5 to 10.  Consider the suggested 
principles in turn. 
 i) The first principle is called "polluter pays principle (PPP)" and relies on the idea that 
one who is causing an environmental problem has the responsibility to take the necessary 
measures to eliminate the problem and bear the full cost of the measures. The PPP was 
adopted by the OECD countries in 1972 (OECD, 1975). According to this principle, each 
country's share of total abatement costs (here called "scaling factor") is determined as 
follows: 
   SFi = SEi / Σi SEi      and        Σi SFi = 1   (12)  
where SEi denotes country i's unconstrained emissions (defined in section 1) and SFi is the 
scaling factor, on the basis of which country i's total abatement cost will be:  
      Ci = SFi C
*     (13)  
where, as we mentioned, C* = Σi Ci (SAi
*). Therefore, the polluter-pays principle redistributes 
costs according to each country's share of total unconstrained emissions. This principle is 
incomplete as an efficiency principle as it requires only the control costs and not residual 
damages be paid.  It is clear from expressions (12) and (13) that the term "polluter pays" is in 
some sense misleading, because what really happens is that the polluting country bears the cost 
of abating its own pollution (emissions). However, we have preferred to keep in use the term 
"polluter pays" because this was introduced extensively in OECD terminology (OECD, 1975). 
 Indeed, this would seem a fairly equitable principle, even when the country's emissions 
deposit mainly on its own territory. Some interpretation problems arise, however, with the 
"polluter pays principle"; particularly concerning what is to be effectively paid: only control 
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costs (standard PPP) or also the physical damage (extended PPP)?  The latter is hardly 
measurable in monetary terms; moreover, it is often impossible to identify the particular 
polluters responsible for damage, especially if damage becomes visible only after a long period 
(in general ecosystems need a long time to recover, assuming that they can).  Therefore, for 
the purpose of this work we define this principle only on control costs. 
 ii) Looking for a procedure that will lead to a reduction in waste emissions in such a 
way that social welfare rises in both countries, the "Polluter Pays Principle" is  inconsistent 
with a Pareto improvement, as a program of pollution abatement in a polluting country would 
impose costs on this country with no offsetting benefits. Moreover, the PPP is difficult to 
apply in international context as there is not a European Authority to attribute environmental 
costs to the polluter via taxation or regulation. International spillovers constitute a game 
theoretic problem in which the non co-operative solution is inefficient, because each country 
does not take into account the effects of its action on the welfare of other countries when it 
seeks to minimize the costs of pollution net of abatement costs. In a co-operative solution the 
net costs are minimized for all countries together. But this implies that there may be countries 
that are worse off in the co-operative than in the non co-operative solution, in the absence of 
any kind of compensation (e.g. in the form of side payments). The need for side payments 
means, therefore, that the Victim Pays Principle is more appropriate for solving international 
problems. The requirement that the process yields a Pareto-improvement implies a "Victim 
Pays Principle (VPP)" according to which the pollutee country (countries) should bear the 
abatement costs and the residual damage. This principle is the closest one to our non-linear 
programming model. In this case:    
  Si = (Di - iD )/ Σi iD       SFi = (Si / ΣSi)  and     Σi SFi = 1  (14)         
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where Di and iD  are the actual and constrained depositions respectively (defined in section 1). 
Then, if SFi < 0, the country lies beneath its target and doesn't sustain any cost, i.e. we set Ci = 
0 in (13):  a negative cost Ci < 0 would not, in fact, make any sense. However, for this reason, 
the countries for which SFi > 0 will sustain a higher cost burden (unless C
* is shortened by the 
amounts corresponding to the negative scaling factors) and because depositions are not always 
due to internal emissions, this explains why the principle is called "victim pays".  
 The applications of the VPP are rare in reality. This is because where a country has to 
deal with other countries (or country in a bilateral level) on transboundary pollution issues, 
and then an acceptance of the VPP in the negotiations of these issues may give the country a 
reputation of a "weak" negotiator. Mäler (1990) gives another reason: countries with a 
transboundary pollution problem develop a "web of international relations" i.e. they may have 
a large number of links other than the flow of pollutants from one of the countries to the other 
(e.g. trade, capital markets, tourism etc). Therefore, one country may want to make 
concessions in order to improve friendly neighbourhood relations and thereby to achieve 
advantages in other areas of mutual interest. 
 iii) Another way of negotiating is by sharing equally the responsibilities. In this case the 
abatement costs and the residual damage are borne equally by the polluter and the victim 
countries. This third principle is called "equal share of responsibility" and the scaling factor is 
simply the average of the scaling factors given by the polluter pays and the victim pays 
principles.  
 iv) In general it would not be appropriate to expect a poor country to choose to devote 
as high a proportion of its scarce resources to abate pollution as do its rich neighbours. The 
European countries are not equally rich and therefore the poor countries would tend to want 
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to abate less than the rich countries. An indicator of the economic situation of countries is 
given by the Gross National Product (GNP). Therefore, the fourth principle is called "gross 
national product principle", and considers the most global indicator of the countries' economic 
activity, to which emissions are implicitly assumed to be proportional. In this case:                    
   SFi = GNPi / Σi GNPi     and      Σi SFi = 1            (15)           
where GNPi is the real gross national product of country i ($ million, 1985). This principle 
favours the "poor" countries.  
 v) Strictly related to the preceding one is the fifth principle, called "emissions 
intensity". In this case: 
           Si = SEi / GNPi       SFi=(Si / ΣSi)          Σi SFi = 1                  (16)          
 i.e. emissions are considered explicitly, but the other countries' influence disappears from the 
scaling factor. In other words, only country i's emissions' "weight" on country i's gross 
national product matters to evaluate the country's responsibility on pollution. There is no 
explicit consideration of the other countries' emissions, or gross national products, like in 
expressions (14) and (15).  
 vi) It is notable that different countries are likely to value differently the damage which 
pollution causes them. It is not possible to draw general conclusions about the likely variations 
in valuation of damage. In most analyses the aim of defining "'damage cost" is to find the total 
amount that victims of (or sufferers from) pollution would pay to be free of the pollution at a 
given time and place. This "willingness to pay" is then assumed to stem from the victim's 
valuation of the "damage" or harm that the unabated pollution imposes on him. In this thesis 
(as many authors have) the "damage cost" terminology is avoided by referring instead to the 
value of "benefits" of pollution abatement. Therefore, the sixth principle is called "willingness 
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to pay" and it is based on a standard economic theory approach of rational agents (in our case, 
countries) attempting to maximize their utility by maximizing the net benefits of pollution 
control. These are defined as the benefits of an improved environment minus the costs of 
pollution control: each country reduces emissions up to the point where its marginal benefits 
equal the marginal abatement costs.  Here the marginal benefits are identified with the quantity 
of depositions "avoided" per unit of marginal abatement undertaken by the country.  
 Assuming that countries behave rationally, each country reduces emissions up to the 
point at which the countries' net benefits are maximized, which is also the point at which the 
country's marginal benefit equals its marginal abatement cost. So: 
     MBi = MCi      (17)  
The scaling factor for this principle is given by:                   
     Si = MBi(Di- iD )       SFi=(Si / ΣSi)    and      Σi SFi = 1                (18)  
where MBi is the marginal benefit of country i from the abatement of one extra unit of 
emissions in country i, equal to the pre-reform marginal abatement cost; i.e. we extend the 
victim pays principle and expression (12) and instead of considering only tonnes of sulphur 
depositions we weight such tonnes by the value of the marginal benefits as shown by (18). 
Defining  Di - D i = δi as the country's required depositions' reduction, then from (18), the 
countries for which δi > 0 must "repay" the corresponding benefit under the form of a total 
costs' share. However, given the sensible range of variation in sensitivity existing not only 
across countries, but also, as seen, across different areas (Chadwick and Kuylenstierna assume 
the existence of five different sensitivity classes, as shown in scenario 1), the quantity of 
depositions is a very  general  and imprecise approximation for "true" benefit.  
 As mentioned, the values of SFi and Ci obtained with the above principles are shown in 
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tables 5 to 10. In the next section, these results as well as the overall empirical results of the 
non-linear programming model, under each of the scenarios defined in sub-section 1.3, are 
commented on.  An attempt is made to see which countries are favoured and which, on the 
contrary, are penalized by the approaches proposed; and which scenarios and/or which cost 
allocation criteria must be "preferred" from an environmental point of view. Some concluding 
remarks will follow.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 In this section the results obtained from the mathematical programming model are 
interpreted. Using tables 3-4 it is possible to answer the following questions: i) which scenario 
is to be ‘preferred’ and ii) which cost allocation principle is the most ‘equitable’ one across 
countries. Consider the first question. Having presented the two scenarios in section 1, it is 
now possible to show the results of the non – linear programming model under each scenario 
in table 3-4. Looking at the total numbers for Europe, i.e. (SA*=Σi=1
27 (SAi
*) and C*=Σi=1
27 
Ci(SAi
*)), it is tempting to say (as was in section 1) that scenario 1 is the most "severe" one, 
since it is the most expensive (C* = 9,634 million $) and also the one leading to the highest 
required emissions' reduction (SA* = 17,072 thousand tonnes), according to the discussion 
which was explaining the nature of the depositions' target under scenario 1. Looking at table 
1, it can be seen that scenario 2 requires the largest depositions reduction. However, if 
countries co-operate then scenario 1 achieves the highest depositions reduction. 
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Table 3: A "sensitivity" scenario (emissions and depositions in 1000 tons S; costs and benefits in m $)   
 
Countries 
Emissions 
reduction 
IND    CO-OP 
Depositions 
reduction 
 IND    CO-OP 
 Total  
costs 
IND    CO-OP 
 
Benefits 
Albania 120.57  118.97    84.40    92.31  180.81   134.06 +46.75 
Austria 588.79  116.82 226.70   234.19 324.18    36.04 +288.13 
Belgium 258.38  236.55 77.75    125.69 342.41   213.22 +124.19 
Bulgaria 500.11  634.60 217.53   429.47 134.80   207.42 -72.62 
Czechoslovakia 2761.8  749.38 1128.8   903.00 604.70   348.11 +256.59 
Denmark 14.30   109.50 5.10      77.02 0.29     141.44 -141.15 
Finland 511.55  189.05  282.30   245.32 893.23   400.60 +492.63 
France 366.49  473.77 194.95   669.65 275.09   434.80 -159.71 
FRG 1800.4  1336.4 572.10   616.19 2514.9   1228.3 +1286.65 
GDR 1193.7  1209.6 463.35   855.78 1562.2   1625.3 -63.06 
Greece 491.99  365.80 300.66   401.12 501.11   260.69 +240.42 
Hungary 79.95   262.02 22.94    261.72 21.04     89.66 -68.61 
Ireland  12.48     8.92 7.82     17.10 0.24       0.17 +0.07 
Italy 785.31  979.24 463.40   765.56 460.16   657.66 -197.50 
Luxembourg 5.00      3.50 1.00       3.49 0.14       0.06 +0.08 
Netherlands 170.82  167.44 48.00    137.61 184.98   173.17 +11.81 
Norway 145.08   35.47 82.00    148.62 257.59    14.11 +243.48 
Poland 1523.6  1384.2 685.70   1156.22 1375.4   831.94 +543.47 
Portugal 141.10  140.77 94.50    128.72 136.94   136.05 +0.89 
Romania 684.61  713.79 315.40   719.99 182.70   192.56 -9.86 
Spain 1023.8  1030.5 738.50   845.41 239.70   241.15 -1.45 
Sweden 569.69  154.88 319.30   324.02 1032.1    94.11 +937.98 
Switzerland 182.19    9.34 58.30     73.40 274.19     0.46 +273.73 
Turkey 403.86  390.09 305.60   483.64 124.83   121.12 +3.71 
UK 3753.1  3881.4 3531.8   5762.22 627.47   671.95 -44.48 
USSR 849.72  1115.8 458.96   668.99 520.63   906.43 -385.79 
Yugoslavia 1466.3  1254.4 635.07   925.71 896.85   468.53 +428.31 
TOTAL 20405  17072(a) 11322   17072(a) 13669    9634.1   +4103.27 
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Table 4: The  "30% Club" scenario (30% emissions reduction in 1980 emission levels)  
               (emissions and depositions are in 1000 tonnes S; costs and benefits in m $) 
 
Countries 
Emissions 
reduction 
IND    CO-OP 
Depositions 
reduction 
 IND    CO-OP 
 Total  
costs 
IND    CO-OP 
 
Benefits 
Albania 120.17   117.59 89.74     89.74 180.81   114.15 +66.7 
Austria 63.10     81.77 115.70   145.32 3.36       8.77 -5.41 
Belgium 54.60     89.81 27.08     39.00 1.63      11.95 -10.27 
Bulgaria 349.20   621.27 283.80   429.72 87.68    193.85 -106.17 
Czechoslovakia 40.90    570.29 281.06   564.48 14.67    205.42 -190.75 
Denmark 3.00      25.91 11.23     23.19 0.06       2.94 -2.88 
Finland 77.50     32.85 112.96   112.96 41.09      17.36 +23.73 
France 0.00      12.58 288.53   317.77 0.00       2.10 -2.10 
FRG 442.10   810.62 191.86   335.67 155.35   292.98 -137.63 
GDR 327.50   403.11 254.01   336.00 78.93    107.85 -28.92 
Greece 276.40   337.75 299.91   384.49 149.01   212.80 -63.79 
Hungary 0.80     254.08 123.89   225.73 0.39      82.91 -82.53 
Ireland  31.90     38.95 21.83     26.13 5.21       8.35 -3.14 
Italy 569.10   547.51 477.83   477.83 302.11   288.87 +13.25 
Luxembourg 1.00      4.94 0.62       1.54 0.02       0.09 -0.07 
Netherlands 63.50     38.78 37.60     37.60 21.77      9.92 +11.85 
Norway 19.30     26.71 49.34     66.11 0.59       0.81 -0.23 
Poland 691.00   379.77 507.23   517.85 263.21   122.77 +140.43 
Portugal 131.20   128.11 140.04   140.04 115.25   109.57 +5.68 
Romania 646.00   953.95 563.46   777.17 170.03   284.43 -114.39 
Spain 1560.8   1622.7 1179.9   1225.6 408.00   437.11 -29.11 
Sweden 61.80     91.53 123.41   163.57 1.98       8.91 -6.93 
Switzerland 11.50      9.85 38.42     39.54 1.63       0.64 +0.99 
Turkey 1263.4   1204.1 1089.6   1089.6 1385.2   776.28 +608.88 
UK 3164.8   4380.8 4260.1   5665.0 430.21   858.17 -427.96 
USSR 188.50   175.26 134.36   134.36 98.17     90.85 +7.32 
Yugoslavia 1319.8   1232.2 775.32   826.67 784.58   451.13 +333.45 
TOTAL 11479   14193(a) 11479   14193(a) 4701      4701 0 
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 These results should be expected for the following reasons: the "30% Club" scenario 
relies on the idea that countries act independently trying a certain emissions target in the first 
stage, and trying to see if they can achieve better emission and deposition levels if they co-
operate by spending the same total amount of money. Conversely, scenario 1 incorporates a 
more detailed analysis, taking into account both dimensional factors (i.e. the areas of the 
countries) and the different sensitivity levels (despite the implicit, restrictive assumption of a 
uniform depositions’ concentration on land: see section 1). Indeed, the comparison provided 
above shows the existence of a trade-off between emission reductions, on one hand, and both 
control costs and deposition targets on the other hand. Hence, it is useful to calculate for these 
scenarios the quantity of depositions avoided per unit of cost incurred (i.e. the ratio (D-)/C*, 
where D=ΣjDj=34,242 thousand tonnes and indicates Europe's actual depositions, see table 1). 
Doing so, scenario 2 gives the best ratio and scenario 1 the most expensive. Using tables 1 and 
3-4, these ratios are 1.68 and 4.84 thousand tonnes deposition reduction per million $ in the 
non-cooperative case and 2.4 and 4.26 in the co-operative one for scenarios 1 and 2 
respectively.  Therefore, scenario 2, is the most convenient one, since it "minimizes" total 
abatement costs, as a consequence of "maximizing" depositions' reductions per unit of cost in 
all Europe simultaneously. However, scenario 1, i.e. the "sensitivity" depositions' reduction in 
each country, minimizes the total depositions in Europe, while scenario 2 presents the lowest 
total costs (which is logical according to the aim of this scenario). But, it could be argued that 
a higher abatement cost (4,663=9,364-4,701 million $) is worth sustaining if it leads to a much 
higher cut in the depositions' target (2,879=17,072-14,193 thousand tonnes). 
  Finally, considering the benefits that can be achieved if countries co-operate instead of 
acting independently, it can be seen that these benefits are negative for some countries and 
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these countries should be compensated. Scenario 1 is in favour of more countries, although it 
makes Bulgaria, Denmark, France, FRG, Hungary, Italy, Romania, USSR and UK worse off. 
Also, the gains for Ireland and Luxembourg and the loss for Spain are negligible. Romania 
experiences a moderate loss and the UK a substantial loss. Obviously the UK would have no 
incentives to participate in a co-operation to reduce sulphur emissions. Regarding scenario 2, 
we must bear in mind that it redistributes the costs: countries first achieve independently their 
targets and then try to see how could they optimize their efforts by achieving the same or 
higher deposition target reductions by spending the same amount of money; i.e. we have a re-
allocation of the abatement costs in an optimized way as far as countries where control cost is 
cheaper should undertake more abatement. This leads to a more than 40% emissions reduction 
across Europe compared to the case where countries act independently. Therefore, a cost of 
achieving a 30% reduction could in fact achieve a 40% average reduction if an efficient cost 
allocation were adopted.  Mäler (1990) also finds that 40% is achievable, although there are 
differences within countries due to the fact that Mäler uses the unconstrained emissions in the 
year 1984, different transfer matrix and different abatement cost estimates (he uses IIASA's 
control cost data). By acting co-operatively rather than independently Albania, Finland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and Yugoslavia get a better cost 
allocation, while all the other countries are worse off. It is worth mentioning that according to 
this scenario UK enjoys a positive benefit of $7.32 million, while under scenario 1 UK has a 
negative benefit of $385.8 million. Finally, the following table presents a summary of all the 
comparisons presented above regarding the results of the non linear model under the two 
scenarios. 
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 Summary of the main results  
  Scenario 
1  
Scenario 
2 
Total abatement costs  
    (in $ million) 
INDEPENDENTLY 13,669 4,701 
 CO-OPERATIVELY 9,634 4,701 
Total sulphur abated 
   (in 1000 tonnes) 
INDEPENDENTLY 20,405 11,479 
 CO-OPERATIVELY 17,072 14,193 
Depositions reduction 
(in 1000 tonnes) 
INDEPENDENTLY 11,322 11,479 
 CO-OPERATIVELY 17,072 14,193 
(D-)/C* 
(1000 t/$ m) 
INDEPENDENTLY 1.68 4.84 
 CO-OPERATIVELY 2.4 4.26 
 
 A country by country analysis is perhaps necessary before deciding which scenario is 
the "best" one, and this leads us immediately to the second question. The first step for a 
country by country analysis is to look at table 1, from which the major emitters are the 
following: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, East Germany, West Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Poland, Romania, Spain, Turkey, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia (i.e. the 
"Eastern block" and the major EU members plus Turkey). Now, from tables 5-10, which show 
the non-linear programming model's cost allocation according to different principles, both 
scaling factors and required emission reductions do reflect, under each scenario, the 
importance of these countries' contribution to total emissions. Of course, the same conclusion 
can be drawn for the polluter pays principle (see Table 5 and expression (12), which defines 
the polluter pays principle’s scaling factor). The victim pays principle shows also the relative 
importance of the 14 major emitters mentioned above for each scenario (see table 6). 
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However, due to the different definition of the relevant scaling factor (given  in expression 
(14)), some countries find themselves paying a higher cost share  than they would in the 
polluter pays principle or in the present model's cost allocation.  These countries are Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and USSR.  
 This result is not surprising, since, from Chadwick and Kuylenstierna (1990), such 
countries present very high levels of sensitivity in many parts of their territories, which means 
that depositions tend to concentrate on them. Conversely, some of the 14 major emitters, like 
Italy, Spain, FRG and GDR pay a lower cost share in the victim pays principle than in the 
polluter pays or the non linear programming model principle, due to the lowest depositions' 
sensitivity despite the high level of emissions. Therefore, the opinion presented here is that the 
equal share of responsibility principle is really the most "equitable" one, because it modifies the 
emissions/depositions' weight in total abatement costs in order to have the abatement costs 
borne equally by the polluter and the victim, for all the countries in all scenarios as shown by 
table 7. Conversely, the gross national product principle presents very low cost shares for all 
Eastern block countries (except the USSR), which are, however, included in the 14 major 
emitters; while countries like the Netherlands, Sweden or Switzerland (plus, of course, the 
main EU members) show a sensible increase in their scaling factors with respect to other 
principles, because of their sustained economic activity (represented by the gross national 
product). The emissions' intensity principle "overcorrects" this phenomenon, in the sense that 
the Eastern block countries register in this case too high cost shares with respect to all other 
principles: this is due to the joint influence of low gross national products and high emissions 
standards on the definition of the scaling factor (recall expression (16)), except for the Soviet 
Union, which registers a very low scaling factor in all scenarios. This is probably because the 
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elevated values of emissions, depositions and gross national product in this country are due to 
its large territory rather than anything else (including the emissions/gross national product 
ratio). 
   Finally, the "willingness to pay principle" is quite "variable" across scenarios, since the 
difference between actual and constrained depositions (Di- iD ) is considered explicitly in the 
scaling factor (see expressions (17) and (18)). However, the countries for which such a scaling 
factor is larger than the one given by our model (i.e. the countries which are not "willing to 
pay" the corresponding amount of abatement costs) are basically the following: for scenario 1  
Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland; and for scenario 2 Albania, Austria,  Belgium, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, FRG, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, 
Turkey and the UK. Recalling (17) and (18), the conclusion is that such countries pay "more 
than they ought to" if the amount by which actual internal depositions exceed target 
depositions was also considered in the evaluation of the country's total abatement cost. Then, 
given that these countries present a high level of economic activity and given that they are not 
all included in the 14 major emitters, the willingness to pay principle may not be considered as 
the most "equitable" in redistributing total optimal abatement costs between European 
countries as it favours the major emitters (e.g. GDR, Italy, USSR, Yugoslavia, etc).  In 
general, all these cost-allocation principles give a good indication of which countries could 
eventually be required to implement more consistent abatement strategies for reducing the acid 
rain impact over all Europe.  
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Table 5: Scaling factors and costs for the "polluter pays 
principle" (emissions are given in 1000 tonnes of S and total 
costs in m $) 
 
          EM      SF       C Sc1     C Sc2                     
                 
    ALB   200   0.005841     56.27    27.46    
    AUS   187   0.005461     52.62    25.67 
    BEL   329   0.009609     92.57    45.17  
    BUL   961   0.028067    270.40   131.94 
    CZE  1216   0.035514    342.14   166.95 
    DEN   143   0.004176     40.24    19.63 
    FIN   270   0.007886     75.97    37.07 
    FRA   765   0.022342    215.25   105.03 
    GDR  2099   0.061303    590.59   288.18 
    FRG  1556   0.045444    437.81   213.63 
    GRE   450   0.013143    126.62    61.78 
    HUN   467   0.013639    131.40    64.12  
    IRE    83   0.002424     23.35    11.40  
    ITA  1715   0.050088    482.55   235.46 
    LUX    15   0.000438      4.22     2.06 
    NET   242   0.007068     68.09    33.23 
    NOR    69   0.002015     19.41     9.47 
    POL  2182   0.063727    613.95   299.58 
    POR   218   0.006367     61.34    29.93 
    ROM  1374   0.040129    386.60   188.64 
    SPA  2573   0.075146    723.96   353.26 
    SWE   248   0.007243     69.78    34.05 
    SWI    50   0.001460     14.07     6.86 
    TUR  2203   0.064340    619.85   302.46 
    SU  10890   0.318049   3064.10  1495.14 
    UK   1844   0.053855    518.84   253.17 
    YUG  1891   0.055228    532.07   259.62 
  
  TOTAL 34240   1.000000   9634.06  4700.97 
 
where: EM stands for unconstrained sulphur emissions in the year 
2000; SF is the scaling factors; C Sc1 and C Sc2 are the total 
costs according to scenarios 1 and 2 respectively. 
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Table 6: Scaling factors and costs for the "victim pays 
principle"  (total costs in million $) 
  
         SF Sc1     SF Sc2     C Sc1    C Sc2     
   
  ALB   0.005207   0.002823     50.16    13.27  
  AUS   0.006500   0.011435     62.62    53.76  
  BEL   0.004451   0.006718     42.89    31.58  
  BUL   0.021091   0.018372    203.20    86.37 
  CZE   0.013983   0.051352    134.72   241.41 
  DEN   0.004523   0.004295     43.58    20.19 
  FIN   0.006125   0.013620     59.01    64.03 
  FRA   0.043015   0.039295    414.41   184.72 
  GDR   0.016539   0.033393    159.34   156.98 
  FRG   0.033594   0.043095    323.64   202.59 
  GRE   0.012771   0.012920    123.03    60.73 
  HUN   0.017983   0.013711    173.24    64.46 
  IRE   0.002751   0.002160     26.50    10.15 
  ITA   0.038250   0.037964    368.50   178.47 
  LUX   0.000261   0.000280      2.52     1.32 
  NET   0.006574   0.007090     63.33    33.33 
  NOR   0.007183   0.008683     69.20    40.82 
  POL   0.051080   0.059384    492.10   279.16 
  POR   0.005986   0.004040     57.67    18.99 
  ROM   0.044214   0.033719    425.96   158.51 
  SPA   0.055442   0.036553    534.13   171.84 
  SWE   0.009347   0.018037     90.05    84.79 
  SWI   0.003296   0.004199     31.75    19.74 
  TUR   0.072721   0.038940    700.60   183.06 
  SU    0.452293   0.424411   4357.42  1995.14 
  UK    0.028648   0.043168    275.99   202.93 
  YUG   0.036174   0.030342    348.51   142.64 
  
 TOTAL  1.000000   1.000000   9634.06  4700.97 
 
where:  SF Sc1 and SF Sc2  are the scaling factors according to 
scenarios 1 and 2 respectively; C Sc1 and C Sc2  are the total 
costs according to our scenario 1 and 2 respectively. 
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Table 7: Scaling factors and costs for the "equal share of 
responsibility principle" (total costs in million $) 
  
         SF Sc1     SF Sc2     C Sc1     C Sc2 
  
  ALB   0.005524   0.004332     53.22    20.36  
  AUS   0.005981   0.008448     57.62    39.72  
  BEL   0.007030   0.008163     67.73    38.38  
  BUL   0.024579   0.023219    236.80   109.15 
  CZE   0.024749   0.043433    238.43   204.18 
  DEN   0.004350   0.004236     41.91    19.91 
  FIN   0.007005   0.010753     67.49    50.55 
  FRA   0.032678   0.030818    314.83   144.88 
  GDR   0.038921   0.047348    374.96   222.58 
  FRG   0.039519   0.044270    380.73   208.11 
  GRE   0.012957   0.013031    124.82    61.26 
  HUN   0.015811   0.013675    152.32    64.29 
  IRE   0.002587   0.002292     24.93    10.77 
  ITA   0.044169   0.044026    425.52   206.96 
  LUX   0.000350   0.000359      3.37     1.69 
  NET   0.006821   0.007079     65.71    33.28 
  NOR   0.004599   0.005349     44.31    25.15 
  POL   0.057403   0.061555    553.02   289.37 
  POR   0.006176   0.005203     59.50    24.46 
  ROM   0.042171   0.036924    406.28   173.58 
  SPA   0.065294   0.055850    629.05   262.55 
  SWE   0.008295   0.012640     79.91    59.42 
  SWI   0.002378   0.002830     22.91    13.30 
  TUR   0.068530   0.051640    660.23   242.76 
  SU    0.385171   0.371230   3710.76  1745.14 
  UK    0.041251   0.048512    397.42   228.05 
  YUG   0.045701   0.042785    440.29   201.13 
  
 TOTAL  1.000000   1.000000   9634.06  4700.97 
 
where:  SF Sc1 and SF Sc2  are the scaling factors according to 
scenarios 1 and 2 respectively; C Sc1 and C Sc2 are the total 
costs according to scenarios 1 and 2 respectively. 
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Table 8: Scaling factors and costs for the "gross national 
product principle" (GNP and total costs in million $) 
   
           GNP       SF         C Sc1     C Sc2 
  
  ALB      2800   0.000514      4.95      2.42 
  AUS     69060   0.012678    122.14     59.60 
  BEL     83230   0.015280    147.21     71.83 
  BUL     25530   0.004687     45.15     22.03 
  CZE     85960   0.015781    152.03     74.19 
  DEN     57330   0.010525    101.40     49.48 
  FIN     53450   0.009813     94.53     46.13 
  FRA    526630   0.096681    931.43    454.49 
  GDR     93631   0.017189    165.60     80.81 
  FRG    667970   0.122629   1181.41    576.47 
  GRE     35250   0.006471     62.35     30.42 
  HUN     20720   0.003804     36.65     17.88 
  IRE     17250   0.003167     30.51     14.89 
  ITA    371050   0.068119    656.26    320.22 
  LUX      4900   0.000900      8.67      4.23 
  NET    132920   0.024402    235.09    114.71 
  NOR     57580   0.010571    101.84     49.69 
  POL     78960   0.014496    139.65     68.14 
  POR     20140   0.003697     35.62     17.38 
  ROM     45536   0.008360     80.54     39.30 
  SPA    168820   0.030993    298.58    145.70 
  SWE     99050   0.018184    175.19     85.48 
  SWI    105180   0.019309    186.03     90.77 
  TUR     56060   0.010292     99.15     48.38 
  SU    2046000   0.375613   3618.67   1765.75 
  UK     474190   0.087054    838.68    409.24 
  YUG     47900   0.008794     84.72     41.34 
 
 TOTAL  5447097   1.000000   9634.06   4700.97 
 
where: GNP stands for gross national product; SF is the scaling 
factors; C Sc1 and C Sc2 are the total costs according to 
scenarios 1 and 2 respectively. 
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Table 9: Scaling factors and costs for the "emissions intensity 
principle" (total costs in million $) 
  
           SF       C Sc1     C Sc2      
 
  ALB   0.183489   1767.74   862.575 
  AUS   0.006956     67.01    32.699 
  BEL   0.010154     97.83    47.735 
  BUL   0.096696    931.58   454.566 
  CZE   0.036339    350.09   170.829 
  DEN   0.006408     61.73    30.122 
  FIN   0.012976    125.02    61.002 
  FRA   0.003732     35.95    17.542 
  GDR   0.057588    554.80   270.718 
  FRG   0.005984     57.65    28.130 
  GRE   0.032794    315.94   154.162 
  HUN   0.057898    557.79   272.177 
  IRE   0.012360    119.08    58.105 
  ITA   0.011873    114.39    55.816 
  LUX   0.007864     75.76    36.967 
  NET   0.004677     45.06    21.986 
  NOR   0.003078     29.66    14.471 
  POL   0.070988    683.90   333.712 
  POR   0.027806    267.88   130.714 
  ROM   0.077512    746.76   364.382 
  SPA   0.039152    377.19   184.052 
  SWE   0.006432     61.96    30.236 
  SWI   0.001221     11.76     5.741 
  TUR   0.100948    972.54   474.555 
  SU    0.013673    131.73    64.276 
  UK    0.009990     96.24    46.961 
  YUG   0.101413    977.02   476.739 
  
 TOTAL  1.000000   9634.06   4700.97 
 
where: SF is the scaling factors; C Sc1 and C Sc2 are the total 
costs according to scenarios 1 and 2 respectively. 
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Table 10: Scaling factors and costs for the "willingness to pay 
principle" (total costs in million $) 
 
         SF Sc1     SF Sc2     C Sc1     C Sc2     
 
  ALB   0.028336   0.036574    272.99    171.93 
  AUS   0.022795   0.023089    219.61    108.54 
  BEL   0.007717   0.005486     74.35     25.79  
  BUL   0.011567   0.029224    111.43    137.38 
  CZE   0.036852   0.057943    355.04    272.39 
  DEN   0.011498   0.004275    110.77     20.10 
  FIN   0.113153   0.018206   1090.12     85.59 
  FRA   0.087603   0.054071    843.97    254.19 
  GDR   0.127246   0.017409   1225.90     81.84 
  FRG   0.092496   0.043205    891.11    203.11 
  GRE   0.024411   0.034164    235.17    160.60 
  HUN   0.017469   0.034019    168.30    159.92 
  IRE   0.000017   0.001661      0.16      7.81 
  ITA   0.015415   0.029365    148.51    138.05 
  LUX   0.000083   0.000009      0.80      0.04 
  NET   0.019530   0.000371    188.15      1.74 
  NOR   0.039279   0.001117    378.41      5.25 
  POL   0.191068   0.041727   1840.76    196.16 
  POR   0.007571   0.011340     72.94     53.31 
  ROM   0.008150   0.042067     78.52    197.76 
  SPA   0.004107   0.018589     39.56     87.38 
  SWE   0.034258   0.001298    330.04      6.10 
  SWI   0.000140   0.000622      1.35      2.92 
  TUR   0.007612   0.238138     73.34   1119.48 
  SU    0.049712   0.173339    478.93    814.86 
  UK    0.015805   0.023373    152.27    109.88 
  YUG   0.026110   0.059317    251.55    278.85 
  
 TOTAL  1.000000   1.000000   9634.06   4700.97 
 
where:  SF Sc1 and SF Sc2  are the scaling factors according to 
scenarios 1 and 2 respectively; C Sc1 and  C Sc2 are the total 
costs according to scenarios 1 and 2 respectively. 
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 A non-linear programming approach for minimizing pollution control costs in 27 
European countries simultaneously or independently has been proposed.  The analysis here has 
been developed using the example of sulphur as the polluting substance to control; and it has 
been assumed that there exists two possible "scenarios" of sulphur depositions or emissions in 
Europe in order to fix the constraints to the optimization problem. The results obtained lead to 
the following conclusions:  
(1) The scenario maximizing the quantity of sulphur depositions avoided in receptor-countries 
per unit of cost incurred in emitting-countries is the "30% Club" one.  However, the "30% 
Club" scenario requires the highest deposition reductions when countries act independently 
but the lowest reduction is achieved when countries co-operate. It can be seen that uniform 
percentage reductions in emissions by each country are potentially inefficient because these 
reductions do not take into account any environmental objectives, variation in control costs 
between countries as well as the fact that national control strategies have not been designed to 
maximize economic efficiency. On the other hand, scenario 1 leads to a much higher cut in the 
depositions' target but as it could be expected in a higher abatement cost.  
(2) The cost of achieving a 30% uniform reduction could in fact achieve a 40% average 
reduction if an efficient cost allocation were adopted. 
 (3) The most ‘equitable’ principle for distributing the optimal total abatement cost in Europe 
between the countries, given their main characteristics such as ‘unconstrained’ emissions, 
sensitivity to depositions, total area and/or gross national product, was the one based on a 
simple average of each country’s contribution to both total emissions and depositions. 
Therefore, the ‘joint’ application of the writer’s ‘sensitivity’ depositions reduction scenario, 
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and an ‘equal share of responsibility’ principle in Europe’ s total sulphur emissions and 
depositions targets for determining each country’s cost share, should provide a good 
indication to planners for containing the ‘acid rain’ impact in Europe within reasonable limits. 
Co-operative solutions can achieve environmental targets in a more cost-effective way. But 
there is a need for a mechanism for international transfers in order to motivate countries to co-
operate. There are a number of reasons why a country may not be willing to co-operate.  First, 
the country may find the scientific evidence unconvincing and therefore either does not accept 
that there is an environmental problem or believes that the risks are exaggerated.  Second, the 
country may accept that a particular environmental problem exists, but attach a lower priority 
to solving it than do countries backing the proposed international agreement.  Levels of 
concern about environmental issues differ among countries due to differences in preferences, 
per capita income, environmental endowments, the degree of environmental concern for future 
generations, expectations about the pace of future technological innovations etc.  Third, the 
country may be trying to free-ride on the efforts of other countries to solve the problem. 
Without a world government and with the number of countries increasing, the likelihood of 
free-riding rises.  Fourth, poorer OECD countries and eastern European countries face 
problems due to the fact that in these countries individual plants are too old to be retrofitted 
and must be replaced; and governments whose people face poverty and deprivation or who are 
trying hard to catch up with their richer neighbours inevitably place lower priority on 
environmental measures.  Finally, a government failure may result in too little protection of the 
environment as far as governments respond to political pressure rather than maximizing social 
welfare.  Also, government failure in one country can reduce the desirable level of abatement 
in other countries. 
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 At the same time, there is a series of options for promoting co-operation.  The first 
step is to identify which of the reasons mentioned above is behind the cause of non co-
operative behaviour.  With the first two reasons, the solution relies on better scientific 
evidence and persuasion to change rankings.  Sometimes the country may disagree with the 
proposed inter-country allocation of responsibility, for dealing with regional and global 
environmental problems.  Responsibility may include modifying behaviour by consuming less 
fossil fuels and paying for cleaning-up existing problems.  For the problem of free-riding a 
binding agreement which requires an incentive system in the form of side payments, cash or 
technology transfers to potential defectors is needed.  In such side payments the victims pay 
polluters to reduce pollution.  For the fourth reason, obviously there is a great potential for the 
richer countries of Europe, to provide assistance to poorer ones for environmental 
investments.  Finally, governments should undertake pollution control strategies and should 
ideally maximize social welfare rather than responding simply to political pressure. To avoid a 
government failure that results in too little protection of the environment a supra-national 
institution needs to be established which should not be subject to the same pressure as national 
governments. This institution would identify conflicts, evaluate them on social terms, and 
resolve them. Also, such an institution would facilitate transfer payments between countries in 
order to promote co-operation. 
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NOTES 
 
(1) These schemes utilize the source-receptor linkages, as described by the source-receptor 
matrices produced by long range atmospheric transport models (like the EMEP model), to 
select the source areas where emission reduction should take place. For the purpose of 
estimating changes in concentration and depositions due to emission changes, Shaw and 
Young assume that the deposition at a receptor location is the sum of the partial contributions, 
each of which is proportional to the emissions from a source or from a group of sources. If Ej 
is the emission rate in source region j and TAJ is a coefficient of proportionality connecting the 
source region with the receptor A, then the deposition DA at receptor A is of the form 
                  
   DA = TA1E1 + TA2E2 + ... + TAJEJ + TANEN 
 
(2) Other types of abatement options that are omitted in this approach are abatement through 
energy conservation in its broadest sense (energy demand suppression, fuel switching, and 
efficiency measures), fuel substitution and use of low sulphur fuels. Bach (1984) suggested 
that these measures may provide a source of cheap abatement options in addition to 
technologies under consideration.    
 
 (3) The estimates of the flows of sulphur emissions and the subsequent depositions between 
countries are based on the EMEP model (European Monitoring and Evaluation Program, 
Norwegian Meteorological Institute) from which the cross-country "transfer coefficients" dji 
and dii which measure the trade-off of sulphur (total dry and wet deposition of sulphur) 
between all single European countries can be obtained. The proportional transfer coefficients 
of the EMEP's transfer matrices have been used with early and provisional unconstrained 
sulphur emission estimates from SEIY, since modified, to derive a transfer matrix of a closed 
system of 27 countries. There is obviously an uncertainty, regarding the elements of this 
matrix, because of weather variability and different meteorological conditions year by year and 
so on. This means that actual transport matrix coefficients will vary from year to year due to 
these meteorological variations 
 
(4) This background depositions have been excluded in our model, as far as they are 
attributable to natural sources (such as volcanoes, forest fires, etc) but also to emissions 
whose origin cannot be determined and therefore it is impossible to be tracked by our model. 
Of course, if the background depositions are included, then actual depositions in each 
European country will become even larger.   
 
(5) The estimates of the unconstrained sulphur emissions used in this paper are based on early 
work undertaken by the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) at York. They should, 
however, be regarded as indicative only. Obviously, subsequent revision to estimate of energy 
balances and fuel sulphur content for the year 2000 will lead to revisions of the cost estimates. 
Later estimates by the SEI, to be published shortly, may be more realistic.  
 
(6) See note 5. 
 
(7) On the mainstream of Klaasen and Jansen (1989), who provide a critical review and some 
numeric examples, also related to Europe, of most existing pollution control allocation criteria.  
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